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An identity crisisNatoYour browser does not support the element. has long afflicted the Quad, a coalition that groups America, Australia, India and Japan. It began in 2007 as a security partnership of countries wary of China’s rise. But it has largely shied away from explicit military co-operation. Its summits usually exclude defence officials and uniformed officers. It does not officially do military drills (although the four countries exercise together). And recently, it has focused more on areas such as vaccine distribution and disaster relief.Such pussyfooting is apparently out of fashion now that Donald Trump is back. On January 21st, a day after his inauguration, his secretary of state, Marco Rubio, hosted a Quad foreign ministers’ meeting in Washington. They issued an unusually brief joint statement that was squarely focused on security and, without mentioning China, left little to the imagination.The quartet reaffirmed its commitment to a “free and open Indo-Pacific where the rule of law, democratic values, sovereignty, and territorial integrity are upheld and defended”. It strongly opposed “unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion” and pledged to bolster security across multiple domains. The Quad would meet regularly before its next leaders’ summit in India, it said.Mr Trump and Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, also affirmed their commitment to the Quad in a call on January 27th. Many China hawks were delighted. They saw clear signals that Mr Trump remains committed to the coalition, despite his scepticism of American alliances.Many involved with the coalition felt that the Quad had recently deferred too much to concerns about provoking China (which denounces it as an “Asian ”). America’s previous president, Joe Biden, elevated the Quad’s status by holding six meetings of its leaders but steered it towards providing “public goods”. Members avoided using its original title: the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.Still, a punchier Quad will prompt familiar concerns, especially for India. Mr Modi gets on well with Mr Trump and boosted defence ties with America following a deadly clash on the India-China border in 2020. But after reaching a deal on that border dispute in October 2024, Mr Modi wants to rebuild economic ties to China. The two countries just agreed to resume direct air links, for example.Indian officials also worry that Mr Trump might strike a bargain with China on trade, or even Taiwan. “It is not very clear what intention Trump has in managing that relationship,” says Shyam Saran, a former Indian foreign secretary. “If there’s a tactical accommodation, obviously it will have its impact on the Quad.”Like many world leaders, Mr Modi is keen to please Mr Trump, not least to avoid tariffs. And India’s leader wants to make a success of the Quad summit in Delhi, which will probably happen in September and be Mr Trump’s first visit to India in his second term (Mr Modi may go to Washington in February).But India remains firmly opposed to anything resembling a formal alliance with America. That could make it hard to upgrade quadrilateral military exercises. Sharing more intelligence with India via the Quad, as suggested by the Heritage Foundation’s “Project 2025” blueprint for Mr Trump’s second term, could also be complicated by India’s close ties to Russia. And though Mr Trump urged Mr Modi on their call to buy more American security equipment, India has to balance that with its limited budget and desire to make more arms domestically.A more promising area is the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, which was launched in 2022 at the second in-person Quad leaders’ summit. It contracts private companies to provide Indo-Pacific governments with near-real-time data to help monitor coastal waters and use naval and coastguard resources more effectively, particularly against Chinese incursions. The Quad began by sharing such data in South-East Asia and the Pacific and says it is expanding to the Indian Ocean region via a data centre near Delhi.Enlisting more partners and adding more data to that programme will help to refocus the Quad on security. Enhancing “Quad Plus” activities involving other countries will help, too. The coalition will have to do much more to fulfil the promise of its January meeting. Achieving that may push India beyond its comfort zone. But it could finally transform the Quad into an effective check on China’s ambitions.
