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AN ATTEMPT TOAUKUSYour browser does not support the element. stage a self-coup in a democratic country—and an American ally to boot—should be the sort of thing that causes the resident of the White House to have some strong views. Yet when Yoon Suk Yeol, South Korea’s president, imposed martial law on his country early last month, President Joe Biden stayed mum. His national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, said events in South Korea raised “alarm bells”. It took more than a month before Mr Sullivan could bring himself to call it “wrong”.Why the reserve? Mr Yoon went further than any leader in South Korea’s modern democratic history in reconciling his country with Japan, a development sought by American strategists for decades. A summit between leaders of the three countries in 2023 seemed like a breakthrough. Amid the uncertainty around Mr Yoon’s future in the immediate aftermath of the coup, the Biden administration hedged its bets.Now the trilateral seems more likely to break down. Its close association with the polarising Mr Yoon had made it unpopular in South Korea from the start. After his failed putsch, the stigma will be even greater. Any successor is likely to at least slow, if not reverse, the changes that America had so desired.The link between South Korea and Japan was to be one strip in what Mr Sullivan has called a “latticework” of new, overlapping partnerships among American allies and security partners in Asia. This, he explains, differs from the traditional “hub and spoke” structure of security co-operation in the region, with America at its centre. The idea is for countries to reinforce each other, rather than simply rely on America. It is likely to be remembered as among Mr Biden’s most important legacies in Asia.The success of the policy is visible in the partnerships that have emerged in recent years. Japan and Australia are working closer than ever before. The Philippines has signed new security deals with both of them. The Quad, a security grouping that brings together the leaders of America, Australia, India and Japan, usually annually, has been given new energy and elevated in importance to the level of summit meetings. A submarine-building pact, known as , brings Britain into the picture.Yet the South Korean setback exposes a problem with the way Mr Biden and his team have woven their latticework. Though he wooed leaders like Mr Yoon, he tended to alienate their political opponents. Some left-wing legislators in South Korea say they got the cold shoulder when they tried to talk about security policy with Mr Biden’s people. The same lawmakers may soon be in power in Seoul.Another potential problem is the latticework’s complexity. A better metaphor might be a mechanical watch, with its many moving parts of varying importance. Mr Biden’s aides argue it will keep ticking on, regardless of who is in the White House, powered by anxiety about China’s rise. Others worry that without constant American attention and maintenance, it will begin to fall apart.Which is the more likely under Donald Trump? The president-elect has little patience for complications, leaving them to his advisers. In the first term they worked to turn Mr Trump’s instincts on Asia into a coherent approach, reframing American policy in the region around what they called “competition” with China. The new paradigm stuck. But their capacity to carry it out was limited because many Asia-policy roles went unfilled for long periods. Stray interventions by the president made it difficult to focus on what mattered.A more disciplined second term might let Mr Trump maintain the machine. A creative team might even add to it. There was some of this in the first term. Mike Pompeo, Mr Trump’s secretary of state, joined the first meeting since 2007 of foreign ministers from Quad countries. Mr Trump also put some life into diplomacy in the Pacific, becoming the first president to host the leaders of the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau—all American protectorates—at the White House. The Biden administration built upon these initiatives.Mr Biden’s advisers wave away concerns about their successors’ diplomatic finesse. In fact, they refuse to claim credit for the latticework themselves. They attribute it instead to their Chinese counterparts, whose audacity alarms America’s allies and has them drawing closer to each other. The system, they say, works even in the absence of disciplined American leadership—provided that China gives it a kick now and then.
