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NOT EVENHTSSNAHTSSDFHTSSNASDFSNASDFHTSHTSSNASDFHTSSNASDFYour browser does not support the element. the Syrian rebels themselves thought they would be so successful. When they began a in northern Syria on November 27th, they found Bashar al-Assad’s regime in disarray. His troops fled. Within days the insurgents had captured Aleppo, Syria’s second city. The advance slowed around Hama, 120km to the south—but did not stop. On December 5th the rebels reportedly took the city (see map). For the first time in a decade, Mr Assad’s rule looks vulnerable.Two rebel groups are leading the push. One is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (), which emerged from al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. It cut ties with the jihadist group in 2017 and has since set up a provisional government in rebel-held Idlib province in north-west Syria. The other faction, the Syrian National Army (), is a Turkish proxy.They are far better trained than the rebels of a decade ago: they have made good use of drones, both for surveillance and combat, and deployed special-forces units ahead of their main thrust. Fleeing Syrian troops left behind tanks, artillery and other kit, which the rebels will no doubt put to use.After Hama, ’s next goal will be Homs, 50km farther south. A victory there would sever the main road linking Damascus to the coast, the heartland of Mr Assad’s Alawite sect. That would make it extremely difficult for the regime to defend and resupply the capital.At the same time, rebels are also consolidating their control around Aleppo. This has led to tension with the Syrian Democratic Forces (), a mainly Kurdish militia (backed by America) that controls much of the north-east. has told the group’s leaders that it has no quarrel with them, only with the Assad regime, and has offered them safe passage. The has not been so benevolent: its Turkish backers consider the a terrorist group because of its ties to Kurdish separatists in Turkey. There have been reports of clashes between the and the .Residents of Aleppo are nervous, both that the regime will fight to retake the city and about the prospect of rule. , the group’s leader, has tried to reassure Christians and other minorities that they have nothing to fear. His fighters distributed sweets outside churches and unfurled the Syrian opposition flag on Aleppo’s ancient citadel rather than an Islamic banner. On December 1st the Orthodox church in Aleppo celebrated mass as usual. Not everyone is convinced: even if Mr Jolani is sincere about his break from jihadism, some of his allies are not.Another fear is that will turn out to be little better than Mr Assad’s regime. The group has become increasingly authoritarian in recent years, jailing and torturing hundreds of critics. Corruption is a growing problem. There have been protests in Idlib over unemployment and high taxes. The is far worse: many Syrians regard it as a collection of thugs and criminals.All this is a reminder of just how maddeningly complex the Syrian conflict has become—and that is before you get to foreign powers. Mr Assad was thought to be in Moscow when the rebel offensive began, returning to Damascus over the weekend. On December 1st Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian foreign minister, paid him a visit. The Syrian president is pleading with Russia and Iran, his two closest allies, to help him push back the rebel offensive.Over the past week Russian jets have bombed Idlib and Aleppo. But Russia’s ability to help is limited. It leases a naval base in the coastal city of Tartus and keeps a detachment of warplanes at nearby Khmeimim airbase. Small contingents of Russian troops across the country have tried to train the Syrian army into a more professional force (the rout in Aleppo suggests those efforts have gone poorly).But Russia’s presence in Syria has shrunk since its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Even at its peak, its role was that of a force multiplier: helping the regime plan military operations and offering air support, surveillance, logistics and intelligence. It preferred to leave most of the ground fighting to others.Iran supplied much of the cannon fodder, but it too has been diminished. Hizbullah, the Lebanese Shia militia it supports, has been battered by a year of war with Israel. It cannot deploy thousands of fighters to help Mr Assad as it did a decade ago. Iran itself has endured a year of Israeli strikes on its military infrastructure in Syria. It is also under pressure in eastern Syria, where the , with American support, is battling Iranian-backed militias for control of villages near Deir ez-Zor.A few weeks ago, Mr Assad might have felt confident. Most Arab states had restored diplomatic ties with him; some were even lobbying America to lift sanctions on his regime. Russia thought it could convince Donald Trump to withdraw American troops from eastern Syria.The precipitous reversal was predictable. Mr Assad’s regime has been hollowed out by years of war and corruption. Syria’s economy has collapsed: unemployment is high, inflation higher. The army is full of young men press-ganged into long service for low pay. Mr Assad might find loyalists willing to fight for their own villages, especially in Alawite areas. But his army is too demoralised to do much more than that.He may hope that a deal will save him. The front lines in Syria had been largely frozen since 2020 because of an agreement between Russia and Turkey. Though the latter has supported both and the , it is probably edgy about the idea of a rebel march on Damascus. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish president, instead seeks a deal with the Syrian dictator to send back millions of Syrian refugees and establish a buffer zone that will push the away from the border.For months Mr Erdogan has tried to negotiate such an agreement, only to be rebuffed: Mr Assad does not make concessions to anyone. (Indeed, his stubbornness has even irritated Vladimir Putin.) Now, though, his position is far weaker. The fall of Aleppo gives Turkey a larger buffer zone than it could have imagined. Mr Erdogan may hope this will let him dictate terms—and that Mr Assad, desperate to save what remains of his rump state, will have no choice but to accept them.
