Why Myanmar’s army is wrong to reject limits on its power

WITH GREAT power comes no responsibility whatsoever—at least, for Myanmar’s army. Although the country is in theory run by a civilian government, the army, or Tatmadaw, retains control of its own affairs. Its top general appoints his own boss, the minister of defence. For good measure, he also gets to pick the ministers of the interior and of border security, giving him control over the police, intelligence services and border guards. This doubtless irks elected politicians, but there is little they can do about it, because the army also chooses a quarter of the members of the national and state parliaments. That is enough to veto any amendments to the constitution, including any changes to these outlandish rules. On March 10th, in fact, the Tatmadaw’s appointees torpedoed constitutional amendments proposed by the government of Aung San Suu Kyi, which would have gradually reduced its representation in parliament, among other things.That is no surprise, but it is a mistake. The Tatmadaw methodically erected this structure for 13 years before it handed power to Miss Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) in 2016. It is hard to know exactly what the army’s intention was, since it is such an opaque and prickly institution. But the generals seem to have wanted to make Myanmar more modern and respectable. That would also serve to improve relations with the West, and so reduce their dependence on China, both economically and diplomatically. They appear to have been delighted to palm off the difficult job of running the country, but wanted to make sure that their exalted status—and past conduct—would not be questioned. They intend to retreat even further from the business of government, the high command continues to insist, once Burmese democracy is “mature”.