America’s allies brace for brinkmanship, deals—and betrayal

From Ukraine to Israel there is a frantic scramble to flatter and sway Donald Trump


LIKE QUIZ-SHOWNATOSCALPAUKUSNATO contestants trying to bash the buzzer first, Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, and Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, raced to congratulate Donald Trump on his victory—though each for very different reasons. The rush by these and other leaders around the globe, such as Emmanuel Macron of France and Lai Ching-te of Taiwan, to ingratiate themselves with America’s next president reveals much about the perils and opportunities they foresee under Mr Trump, whose only constancy in foreign policy is his unpredictability.Mr Zelensky praised Mr Trump’s “decisive leadership” and commitment to “peace through strength”, perhaps hoping that flattery might do better than an appeal to principle. He moved quickly to try to win the incoming president’s favour ahead of any prospective deal that Mr Trump might try to impose on Ukraine to end the war it has been fighting since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Mr Netanyahu’s message was also fawning as he hailed “history’s greatest comeback”, quite a compliment from the original comeback king, and gushed that Mr Trump’s return offers “a powerful recommitment to the great alliance between Israel and America”. Mr Netanyahu may hope that Mr Trump will give him even more of a free hand in the wars Israel is fighting in Gaza, Lebanon and against Iran, but he must also worry whether Mr Trump’s pledge to “stop the wars” might be achieved by squeezing support for Israel.Mr Trump’s election comes as America and its allies face their most daunting threats since at least the end of the cold war. These include “the potential for near-term major war”, a bipartisan commission mandated by Congress warned earlier this year. And the risks are mounting, as adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea increasingly make common cause. A further escalation in the conflict between Israel and Iran, for instance, could well draw American troops directly into another war in the Middle East. Yet at this moment of heightened peril, America’s friends and foes alike are preparing for the possibility that Mr Trump may upend its foreign policy and weaken the network of alliances that have been the pillars of Western security.The danger will begin well before Mr Trump is sworn in on January 20th, as allies and adversaries probe President Joe Biden’s resolve and authority during the remaining “lame duck” months of his term. The first test will probably be the Middle East on November 12th, the deadline the Biden administration has set for Israel to vastly increase the flow of food and aid to Gaza or risk having its supply of American arms and munitions cut. Mr Netanyahu, whose government is accused of not doing enough to improve the humanitarian situation, may reckon that Israel can withstand any temporary delays in arms deliveries until the inauguration of Mr Trump, who probably does not care. But as Israel faces the possibility of full-scale war with Iran, it needs more than just bombs. It also needs close co-ordination with America’s armed forces to fend off Iranian missiles and to launch its own counter-attacks.In the uncertain period before the next administration takes over, America’s allies are scrambling mitigate some of the risks that may arise from the election of a president who regards allies as a burden and approaches mutual defence with the calculus of a gangster. “They want protection, they don’t pay us money for the protection,” Mr Trump has said. “The mob makes you pay money.” Mr Trump boasts that he coerced countries to spend more on defence during his first term, with some justification. Many expect the pressure to intensify further in his second.Europe’s response will be to try to Trump-proof aid to Ukraine and to bolster the region’s ability to defend itself without American help. Little wonder, then, that in the hours after the election result Boris Pistorius, Germany’s defence minister, and Sébastien Lecornu, his French counterpart, called an emergency meeting in Paris to discuss security. Mr Macron, once dubbed a “Trump whisperer”, has long championed Europe’s collective defence and “strategic autonomy” and will probably do so again at a summit on November 7th. Over the past year Mr Macron has become one of the continent’s most outspoken hawks on Ukraine, refusing to rule out putting boots on the ground there and arguing for the use of French missiles to strike military targets in Russia. The mood in Asia is more phlegmatic. Taiwan is concerned that Mr Trump might fail to come to the island’s aid or cut a deal with China over its head. South Korea worries that Mr Trump might, as he did in his first term, demand more money—or even a “profit margin”, as he once put it—to cover the cost of American troops stationed there. Australians take heart that Mr Trump is thought to be supportive of , the submarine deal between America, Australia and Britain. Though some fret that Mr Trump might seek a grand bargain with Xi Jinping, China’s president, most Australian officials believe that defence co-operation will continue.The trouble for America’s allies, though, is that nobody knows for sure what Mr Trump’s foreign policy will be. Some things seem certain, such as trade wars with friends and foes alike (see The Telegram). He will probably again accommodate some autocrats and threaten to abandon allies or renegotiate terms with them. Tensions with Mexico will probably rise over trade, migrants and drug-trafficking (see Americas section).Yet predicting what Mr Trump would do in any given situation is hard. A lot of the uncertainty arises because of disagreements between those who advise him. Broadly speaking he presides over three schools of thought in the Republican Party. What some call the “primacists” seek to preserve America’s global leadership and the international order. In contrast, “prioritisers” argue that America is dangerously overstretched and should concentrate its resources where they matter most, in Asia, and leave Europe and the Middle East to fend mostly for themselves. This school of thought overlaps with a third, the “restrainers”, who want America to generally do less in the world.Which of these schools predominates will depend on Mr Trump’s picks for the big national-security jobs and whether they are internationalists like Mike Pompeo, Mr Trump’s former secretary of state, and Robert O’Brien, his former national security adviser, or more isolationist figures. It may also depend on how much influence is wielded by J.D. Vance, his vice-president, who hails from the more isolationist wing of the party and who blames Republican and Democratic elites alike for dragging America into wars. While this plays out foreign diplomats in Washington are involved in a frenetic sort of Kremlinology, as they scramble to distinguish influential courtiers from peripheral figures.Given Mr Trump’s repeated criticism of aid to Ukraine and his refusal to say whether he wants Ukraine to win the war, many worry that one of his first moves in office would be to capitulate to Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president. Yet people in his entourage—or at least people who hope to be in it—suggest that Mr Trump would not be such a soft touch (see Europe section). Republican insiders argue that he knows that defeat in Ukraine would be a political liability, just as the withdrawal from Afghanistan was for Mr Biden.Mr Pompeo argued in an opinion article that “there’s no evidence that such capitulation will be part of President Trump’s policy and much evidence to the contrary”. He and his co-author, David Urban, pointed out that Mr Trump supplied the first Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine and that in late September, Mr Trump received Mr Zelensky at Trump Tower in New York.A diplomatic deal crafted on decent terms may yet be welcomed by Ukraine, whose position on the battlefield is weakening. Ukraine would, however, want membership of to guarantee its security. Mr Pompeo is an advocate of that but other advisers may resist it, as would Olaf Scholz, Germany’s chancellor.Another whisper from Republican insiders is that Mr Trump’s administration would be more willing to confront Iran and weaken its clerical regime, a policy that would be widely supported in the Republican Party, they say (see Middle East & Africa section). Israel’s decapitation of Hizbullah and Hamas, and its ability to parry Iran’s missile salvoes, suggest Iran and its allied militias are vulnerable.Mike Waltz, a Republican congressman and a contender to become secretary of defence, wrote for recently that America “should put a credible military option on the table to make clear to the Iranians that America would stop them building nuclear weapons”. Threatening military action against Iran is one thing; starting a war is another. Mr Trump has spent much of his career denouncing Republican hawks who wasted blood and treasure in the Middle East.Complicating this reading of entrails is the fact that Mr Trump is a fan of the madman theory of international diplomacy. Asked whether he would threaten to use force if Mr Xi were to invade Taiwan, Mr Trump told the : “I wouldn’t have to, because he respects me and he knows I’m fucking crazy.” To be sure, unpredictability may sometimes enhance America’s deterrent power, if foes believe Mr Trump really might take military action. But it could weaken America’s position if adversaries conclude he is all bluster and America’s friends lose trust that it will come to their aid. Fearing abandonment by Mr Trump, some allies may hedge by moving closer to China, especially in Asia (see China section). Alternatively, they may seek their own nuclear weapons, ushering in a new era of proliferation.Mr Trump was a disruptive force during his first term but the international scene was relatively calm. He returns to power at a time of rising great-power rivalry and destructive wars in Europe and the Middle East. Instead of building on the alliances and institutions that have enhanced American power, Mr Trump seems intent on undermining them. That would damage not just America’s security, but accelerate the disintegration of the post-war order that kept the peace for 80 years.

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