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IN MOST DEMOCRACIESspdfdpcducdumpcducducsufdpspdspdcducsugdpYour browser does not support the element. a “snap” election might be expected a few weeks hence. In Germany, it will take three and a half months. Party lists must be drawn up, ballot papers printed, municipalities and volunteers mobilised. Moving any quicker, the chief elections officer has warned, would present “incalculable risks”. Yet measured against the usual tempo of change in Germany, political events have developed at a blistering pace.On November 6th long-bubbling rows in Germany’s three-party coalition finally boiled over, when Olaf Scholz, the Social Democrat () chancellor, fired Christian Lindner, his finance minister, leader of the liberal Free Democrats (), in a spat over economic and fiscal policy. That evening, after eviscerating Mr Lindner as an “egotist”, Mr Scholz proposed subjecting himself to a confidence vote in January, and bringing forward an election scheduled for next September to late March.But Mr Scholz’s plainly risible suggestion did not withstand intense pressure from the opposition centre-right Christian Democrats () and others; and after six days he bowed to the inevitable. The confidence vote, the first in two decades and only the sixth in post-war German history, will now take place on December 16th. As the head of what is now a minority government with the Greens, Mr Scholz will expect to lose it. That will set the stage for Germany’s president to dissolve parliament and call elections, now planned for February 23rd. The may help pass a handful of laws in the meantime, says Kai Whittaker, one of its s.Formally, the campaign will kick off in the new year. In reality it has already begun. A feisty exchange in the Bundestag on November 13th offered a preview of its contours. Defending his record, especially his delicate line on Ukraine (yes to “unwavering” support; no to the delivery of Taurus cruise missiles), Mr Scholz vowed to hold together a country he worried risked American-style polarisation. He also attacked those he claimed were setting aid for Ukraine against social spending—a jab at those politicians, Mr Lindner chief among them, who refuse to consider easing Germany’s strict deficit rules to help fund Ukraine. In response Friedrich Merz, head of the , accused his “lightweight” opponent of“liv[ing] in your own cosmos” and issuing “half-truths”. He offered a menu of proposals designed to lift Germany from its economic funk, including reforms to labour-market rules, welfare payments and climate obligations. Mr Lindner, for his part, declared his dismissal a “liberation”, before proceeding to lay into the government in which he had served until just a week earlier.The and the Christian Social Union (), its Bavarian ally, are leading opinion polls with around 33%, a little over the combined score of the three parties of the late coalition. Depending on the election outcome, and in particular on whether the secures the 5% needed to retain a presence in the Bundestag, the conservatives should have their pick of coalition partners. (Some in their ranks quietly wonder if an unprecedented outright majority is within reach.) Mr Merz himself has not won over German voters, but in head-to-head match-ups is well ahead of his deeply unpopular rival. Barring a huge surprise, he will ensure that Mr Scholz becomes one of the shortest-serving chancellors in Germany’s democratic history (see chart).Yet Mr Scholz’s team claim to relish the prospect of an electoral duel with Mr Merz, who despite his 69 years has never held executive office and is not immune to making gaffes under pressure. They remind those who doubt them that Mr Scholz came from behind to win the previous election, in 2021 (albeit barely). Expect a mildly populist campaign that portrays Mr Merz as an out-of-touch millionaire who wants to decimate pensions and welfare, and whose recklessness risks escalating the Ukraine war.Mr Scholz is likely to have his wish for a head-to-head granted, at least. In 2021 the Greens briefly looked like a credible party to lead a government. But their recent dismal polling will probably kill off any similar hopes for their candidate this year, Robert Habeck, despite his skills on the stump. Fringe parties, like the hard-right Alternative for Germany, will hope to exploit the moment of drama but could also struggle to be heard in what is shaping up to be a classic centre-left versus centre-right campaign dominated by economic questions. More than two-thirds of voters say the economy is going downhill. Each mainstream party is brimming with ideas, of varying quality, to effect a turnaround.It was with exquisite timing, then, that moments after Mr Scholz took his seat in parliament Germany’s Council of Economic Experts, a state-backed brains trust, slashed its growth forecast for 2025 and reminded the country that in real terms its economy had barely grown for five years. As well as calling for an easing of bureaucracy and an acceleration of digitalisation, the council urged a reform of the constitutional debt brake, the rule to which Mr Lindner had held fast, to enable more and better public investment.Earlier the same day, Mr Merz, whose party led the effort to create the debt brake 15 years ago, offered his clearest hint yet that he would be open to reforming it, so long as doing so enabled investment rather than extra social spending. That looked like a signal to the and Greens, at least one of which is likely to rule in coalition with the /, of how to prepare for post-election governing negotiations. If so, it is to be welcomed.Yet there are also reasons to doubt that the coming campaign will squarely counter the serious challenges confronting Germany. In parliament, neither Mr Scholz nor Mr Merz had much to say about the threat posed to German prosperity and foreign policy by the return of Donald Trump, beyond 2016-era waffle about ensuring that Europe does more for its own security. It was left to the Bundesbank to warn that Mr Trump’s threatened tariffs could knock a full percentage point off German . Is Germany ready for that?
