How Poland emerged as a leading defence power

It has beenNATOGDPEUNATOGDPNATOEUPSEUNATONATONATOPSPSPSEUNATOPSNATONATONATOGDPNATOEU centuries since Poland was last a great armed power, but the winged hussars are back. When Russia seized Crimea in 2014, Poland’s armed forces were the ninth-biggest in . Today they are third after America and Turkey, having doubled in manpower to over 200,000. The budget has tripled in real terms to $35bn; in Europe, only Britain, France and Germany spend more (see chart). As a percentage of , Poland is well in front.This month Poland assumed the six-month presidency of the Council. Its theme, unsurprisingly, is security. With Russia advancing on the battlefield and Donald Trump’s commitment to uncertain, Europe’s eastern border is looking wobbly. Poland has a fast-growing economy and an able prime minister in Donald Tusk. Can it become Europe’s new eastern security anchor?Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz, the defence minister and a deputy prime minister, thinks so. “We are facing an enormous threat. If we did not take advantage of this opportunity to build up our security, it would be a historic, tragic failure.” Poland is buying hundreds of new tanks, howitzers and multiple-launch rocket systems from South Korea. But the minister gives pride of place to nearly $60bn-worth of purchases from America, including a $10bn deal for 96 Apache attack helicopters and $2.5bn for the Integrated Battle Command System, a digital hub for Patriot air-defence missiles.If Mr Kosiniak-Kamysz stresses American kit, it is because his true audience is in the White House. Mr Trump has floated a defence-spending target of 5% of for members; Poland, the minister notes, is the only member already planning to meet it. It reckons it spent 4.1% in 2024 and will hit 4.7% this year. “We have done what Mr Trump expects,” says Mr Kosiniak-Kamysz. Poland can be “a bridge between the European Union and America”.For all Poland’s newfound strength, its priority is keeping America engaged. One of the ’s most Atlanticist members, Poland long waved off initiatives for European strategic autonomy, especially under the Eurosceptic Law and Justice (i) party that governed between 2015 and 2023. (In 2018 that government tried in vain to get America to build an army base in Poland by promising to name it “Fort Trump”.) Mr Tusk is more -minded, and Mr Trump’s equivocation has convinced the Poles that the continent must do more for itself. But they still see this as a way to keep the Yanks in. “Without America, does not function,” says Mr Kosiniak-Kamysz.Poland’s hesitancy has been clearest on the issue of stationing troops in Ukraine, if a ceasefire can be reached. Emmanuel Macron, France’s president, proposed the idea, and it gained momentum in December as Mr Trump vowed to end the war quickly. Britain and Germany neither endorsed nor dismissed it. But Mr Tusk was reluctant, saying Poland was “not planning” to send soldiers—an attitude seemingly at odds with aspirations to greater security heft. Mr Kosiniak-Kamysz says any decision would have to be made by as a whole.The main reason for the caution is political. A two-round presidential election starts on May 18th, and the fate of Mr Tusk’s government hinges on it. The prime minister has been trying to root out the autocratic legacy of i, which packed the courts, inserted cronies in government and turned the state media into propaganda. But the current president hails from i, and has been vetoing Mr Tusk’s efforts.If the election is won by Rafal Trzaskowski, the liberal mayor of Warsaw and candidate of Mr Tusk’s centrist Civic Coalition, the reforms may move ahead. If it goes to Karol Nawrocki, the conservative historian nominated by i (who is sceptical of and membership for Ukraine), the deadlock will go on. Polls give Mr Trzaskowski a narrow lead. The ruling coalition is fragile. Mr Tusk has failed to liberalise abortion, one of his main campaign promises. That has disappointed left-wing parties allied with Mr Tusk. The centre-right Poland 2050 party has conservative views on abortion, and has slowed reform. The farthest-right coalition member is the small agrarian Polish People’s Party, led by Mr Kosiniak-Kamysz. This month he helped the Catholic church restrict sex education in schools.A second reason for Poland’s reluctance to commit to a hypothetical deployment in Ukraine is bilateral tension. The two countries have a long-running argument over massacres in Volhynia during the second world war, when Ukrainian partisans staged an ethnic-cleansing campaign that killed some 100,000 Poles. Polish historical researchers want permission to exhume victims. But many Ukrainians consider the partisans heroes, and officials have angered Poles by playing down the atrocities.Ukraine agreed this month to allow exhumations. But at a deeper level, Polish ambivalence stems from a perception of ingratitude. Many Poles feel Ukrainians have not thanked them enough for welcoming over a million refugees and acting as the main logistical hub for military aid. More important is a sense that in dealing with allies, Ukraine bypasses Poland. Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, prefers to speak to America, Britain, France, Germany and the European Commission. His administration has little understanding of its western neighbour. Mr Zelensky illustrated the point in a visit to Warsaw on January 15th, irritating i by saying that if Mr Nawrocki opposes Ukraine’s membership, he should start military training to prepare for war with Russia. Justyna Gotkowska, a defence expert at the Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw, says Poland would find it hard to deploy a brigade in Ukraine anyway. The army’s new capabilities will be fully operational only in 2026-27.Mr Zelensky’s visit reportedly aimed to find ways to persuade Mr Trump to stay committed to . Poland’s main offering is its rising defence budget. Unlike other members, it may not need to cut elsewhere: new defence spending is financed by growth of nearly 3% last year, says Michal Baranowski, a deputy minister of economic development. Mr Tusk’s government will push to get Ukraine into and the , however distant the prospects—if only out of self-interest. “The strategy of the Polish army is to keep Russia as far away as possible,” says Mr Kosiniak-Kamysz.