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To understand theGDPGDPGDPYour browser does not support the element.By Anton La Guardia, Diplomatic editor, The Economist forbidding world that Donald Trump will confront, open the 75-page report of a bipartisan commission on national security, published in July. “The threats the United States faces are the most serious and most challenging the nation has encountered since 1945 and include the potential for near-term major war.” America may have to fight several regional conflicts at once, which could merge into a global one. The country, the commissioners said, is not ready for such wars. Worse, Americans are scarcely aware of how the world around them is darkening.The new president will inherit several crises. America is supporting two friends fighting protracted wars, Ukraine and Israel; and tensions are rising in Asia, with potential for conflict over Taiwan, the Koreas or the Philippines. The problems are all the harder to manage because four of the most prominent autocracies—China, Russia, Iran and North Korea—are increasingly making common cause. are growing, too. Whether the quartet constitute a real alliance or not, their deepening partnership is fast becoming the frame of reference for Washington’s foreign-policy debates. Every crisis is increasingly connected to broader geopolitical rivalries.During the campaign Mr Trump veered between hyperbole about an impending “world war three” and glibness about how easily he could prevent it, without saying how. In office he may add to the turmoil.But predicting what he will do is hard. Mr Trump presides over three broad schools of thought in the Republican Party. The “primacists” aim to preserve America’s leadership and the global order it created. America must prevail just about everywhere, they argue; a victory for Russia in Ukraine would embolden China in its threats to invade Taiwan. In contrast, “prioritisers” argue that America is becoming dangerously overstretched. Better to concentrate its limited resources where they matter most, in Asia, and leave Europe and the Middle East to fend mostly for themselves. The prioritisers, in turn, merge fuzzily with “restrainers”, who generally want America to do less in the world. Mr Trump’s picks for the big national-security jobs reflect the full range. Marco Rubio, his choice for secretary of state, is a conventional Republican hawk. Mike Waltz, named as national-security adviser, wants America to turn to Asia. Peter Hegseth, the choice for defence secretary, bemoans the “woke” military and leans towards isolationism.At different times in his first term Mr Trump nodded towards all three groups. But he also has his own impulses: an obsession with trade deficits and tariffs; contempt for alliances; and an attraction to autocrats and a desire to make deals with them. So expect renewed trade wars, especially with China; threats to abandon allies or renegotiate terms with them; the partial or complete end of American military support for Ukraine; greater leeway for Israel in its wars and settlement policies; more economic pressure on Iran; and growing tension with Mexico on everything from trade to migrants and drugs.A big question is whether and how far to increase defence spending, which is close to historical lows at about 3% of and projected to decline. The bipartisan commission recommended a 3-5% real-terms increase in the next fiscal year, and thereafter a “glide path” to cold-war levels of spending (5-17% of ). That is a big jump at a time of strained public finances. The federal deficit is expected to reach 6% of , and will grow substantially under Mr Trump’s plans for tax cuts (though he hopes that tariffs on imports, and slashing wasteful spending, will fill the gap). Securocrats argue that deterrence is cheaper than war. But it is hard to imagine Mr Trump cutting benefits or raising taxes to pay for more weapons.
