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THE NAMEATACMSHIMARSATACMSATACMSATACMSATACMSATACMS ATACMSatacmsscalpicbmYour browser does not support the element. of the weapon, designed in the late 1980s, was both an acronym—Army Tactical Missile System ()—and, when said aloud, an exhortation—“attack ’ems”. But Ukraine could not, in fact, attack ’em—at least not inside Russia, not until November 17th, when it became clear that Joe Biden, America’s president, had changed course and given Ukraine permission to fire the longer-range missiles onto Russian soil. The decision will not dramatically change Ukraine’s flagging fortunes on the front lines, though it will boost morale and strengthen the country’s hand ahead of negotiations likely to be pursued by after January 20th. Until then, a tumultuous two months lie ahead.America first gave Ukraine rocket launchers in the summer of 2022, though equipped only with shorter-range rockets. In late 2023, after over a year of debate, it relented and provided the 300km-range . Ukraine used them to devastating effect in Russian-occupied territory, including Crimea. It destroyed nine helicopters in two strikes that October, but it was denied permission to fire them over the border into Russia against the airfields, ammunition depots and command posts that were being used against it.Mr Biden imposed that restraint for three reasons. One was the Pentagon’s argument that it had limited stocks of and that these were needed for war plans in other parts of the world. The second was that their military effect would, supposedly, be limited. In September the Pentagon said that 90% of Russian jets launching glide bombs at Ukrainian positions had already moved east, out of range of . The third was the risk of escalation. Ukraine has frequently used its own drones and missiles to strike inside Russia—one attack at Toropets in September took out several month’s-worth of ammunition—but strikes typically require American assistance with intelligence and targeting. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, has said that the use of Western missiles in Russia would constitute “direct involvement” in the war.Ukraine and its backers bat these arguments away. They say there are more than enough in America’s inventory—more than 1,000, by some estimates—and they are being gradually replaced with newer and longer-range missiles. Russian jets may be out of range, but other targets abound. Besides logistics hubs and the like, they could include helicopters and attack aircraft providing close-air support to troops. Escalation concerns are also overdone, they argue. After all, Mr Putin considers Crimea to be an inalienable part of Russia and yet did nothing in response to strikes there. Likewise, he has failed to take any dramatic retaliatory steps in response to the West’s steady intensification of arms supply, from small arms to missiles to tanks to fighter jets.Mr Biden’s decision now leaves three big questions. One is the extent of his reversal. Initial reports suggested Ukrainian strikes would be confined to Kursk province, where North Korea is helping retake territory seized by Ukraine. But the first strike appears to have hit an ammunition dump in the Bryansk region next door. That suggests Ukraine may have more latitude than is thought, though America is likely to be vetting every target.The second question is whether the decision catalyses more action by America’s allies. On November 20th Ukraine appears to have fired as many as a dozen British Storm Shadow cruise missiles into Kursk province, suggesting that Mr Biden had also reversed his earlier opposition to their use in Russia. France’s identical missiles are likely to follow. All eyes are now on Olaf Scholz, Germany’s chancellor, who will come under mounting pressure to send German Taurus missiles—a step he ruled out, again, a week ago.The third and most consequential issue is how Mr Putin will choose to respond. America was throwing oil on the fire, said a spokesman for the Kremlin. “If such a decision has been taken, it means a whole new spiral of tension.” On November 19th Russia published a revised nuclear doctrine which lowered the threshold for nuclear use. And on November 21st, Ukraine said that Russia had hit the city of Dnipro with a (conventionally-armed) intercontinental-range ballistic missile (). If true, that would be the first time such a missile has been used in combat anywhere; but the missile type has not yet been confirmed.Actual nuclear use remains far-fetched. More likely is Russian action elsewhere. One concern is that Russia might provide advanced missiles to Houthi rebels in Yemen. Another is that Russian assets will intensify their campaign of sabotage inside Europe. That may already have occurred. On November 18th a pair of undersea data cables in the Baltic Sea were cut. Western security officials from several countries told they did not have hard evidence of sabotage. But Boris Pistorius, Germany’s defence minister, offered a blunt assessment: “Nobody believes that these cables were cut accidentally.” Mr Biden may be hoping that Mr Putin will choose not to respond too aggressively, in order to keep open the prospect of cutting a deal with Mr Trump next year. The president-elect is said to have told Mr Putin in a phone call that he should not escalate the war. The Kremlin denies that the phone call took place. If the account is true, then both Mr Biden and Mr Trump will have had their answer in the skies above Ukraine in the early hours of November 17th: the largest air attacks since last year crippled Ukraine’s power grid and killed a reported 18 people.
