The dangerous chill of Chilcot

BRITISH troops spent six years fighting in Iraq; the official inquiry into how they ended up there has taken nearly seven. Sir John Chilcot’s 2.6m-word report, published on July 6th, is—as foreseen—devastating. Assessments of Iraq’s weapons “were presented with a certainty that was not justified”; planning for after the invasion was “wholly inadequate”. The foreign-policy blunder of the century, billed as a war of necessity, in fact was “not a last resort”.The report holds many lessons, including for this newspaper, which supported the invasion of Iraq: about the danger of impetuous decision-making; of failing to plan; and of making optimistic assumptions (see ). Yet it also carries a risk that the wrong lesson may be learned. As Britain begins the tortuous, regrettable process of disentangling itself from the rest of Europe, it is already in danger of turning inward. The Chilcot report will be read by many not merely as evidence of a badly conceived mission, thinly planned and poorly executed, but as proof that Britain and its Western allies should hasten their retreat from the wider world. That would be bad for all who share those countries’ liberal values.